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In an effort to reconfigure the system for the delivery of agricultural services, the Regional Government of Sardinia in Italy decided, in 2006, to suppress five public entities, and to establish three regional agencies in their place. Based on interviews conducted with managers and staff within these agencies, this paper narrates the episode of implementing the organizational restructuring of this part of the regional government's agricultural policy. Drawing on this case, this paper then presents an explanation of the process of carrying out organizational transformations (namely, mergers and demergers) within sub-national governments' administrative systems. The study finds that policy process features and context conditions figure prominently as explanatory factors for the path and outcome of the implementation of the organizational restructuring. On the whole, the research argument made in this paper suggests some qualifications of existing generalizing arguments about the management of organizational transformations in the public sector. 








Managing the Process of Decentralization: 




	The establishment of relatively autonomous agencies as separate organizations from the executive bureaucracy, charged with the task of implementing sectoral public policies is an organizational design choice made by several governments in the world. Several studies have been done on the diffusion of such public agencies, on the reasons why they are created, and on the performance and political effects of the establishment of quasi-autonomous agencies in the public sector (Christensen and Lægreid, 2006; Moynihan, 2006; Egeberg and Trondal, 2009; Kickert, 2010). Relatively less attention has been placed, however, on the process dynamics of establishing such public agencies, i.e., what affects the flow of efforts required to set up quasi-autonomous agencies and to make them assume responsibilities previously held by branches of the executive bureaucracy. Yet, the creation of such public agencies may involve organizational transformations that call for considerable managerial efforts and political oversight.  
	The use of the term 'agency' here deserves some clarification. Within public administration, agencies have been variously defined as “non-departmental public bodies, hybrids, quangos, fringe bodies, non-majority institutions, quasi-autonomous public organizations, and distributed public governance” (Greve et al., 1999; Flinders, 2004). The meaning of the term 'agency', indeed, seems to vary considerably across cultural, legal, and political systems (Smullen, 2004) as well as over time and countries (Dunleavy, 1991). Within the contemporary scholarly and policy discourse in Europe, an agency is generally understood as a “structurally disaggregated body, formally separated by the ministry, which carries out public tasks at a national level on a permanent basis, is staffed by public servants, is financed mainly by the state budget, and is subjected to public legal procedures” (Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). As such, agencies differ from other non-departmental public bodies, such as independent regulatory authorities and independent government corporations because, while these entities enjoy some autonomy from their respective ministry, government executives normally retain political responsibility for the agencies' activities and outcomes (Christensen and Laegreid, 2003). 
	During around the last 25 years, agencies in various European countries have been often delegated government functions that were previously carried out according to the 'classical' hierarchical mode of administration and regulation by command and control (Christensen and Laegreid 2006; Pollit et al 2004; Boukaert and Peters, 2004). The transfer of government functions to agencies (i.e., the so-called 'agencification' process) was originally related to the rise of increasingly complex social and economic issues that central government administrations seemed unable or unwilling to deal with (Majone, 1994, 1997; Loughlin and Scott 1997; McGowan and Wallace 1996; Moran 2002; Lodge 2001). Over time, the establishment of agencies charged with technically specific tasks and operating outside the formal line of hierarchical control or oversight by the central administration became increasingly common. More recently, the agencification process has also moved to the sub-national level, as regional or local governments have begun decentralizing parts of their public functions to non-departmental public bodies (we should also note that, sometimes, sub-national governments decentralize public functions to local agencies that had been previously devolved from the central to sub-national government levels).
	The process of establishing public agencies entrusted with implementing sectoral public policies previously performed by branches of the executive bureaucracy deserves careful consideration. The decision to create a public agency is typically taken jointly with the one to terminate the activities performed by a given branch of the executive bureaucracy. In this case, either the public agency needs to develop its capacity to deliver the required services ‘from scratch’ while the branch of the executive bureaucracy is left with slack resources, or the executive bureaucracy may transfer part its own personnel and assets to the agency to enable it to operate in its place. In any event, questions arise concerning how newly established public agencies come to acquire personnel and assets and develop work routines for performing their statutory tasks; how the transfer of responsibilities from the executive bureaucracy to the public agency affects the terms of political accountability and control over public service delivery functions; and how the political aspects of context conditions exert influence on the process dynamics of agencification. Answers to these questions are important in order to better understand the kinds of challenges faced by public managers when setting up new public agencies and the actions that they undertake under circumstances related to the interaction of particular process design features and context conditions. 
	The process of establishing public agencies is a special class of 'organizational transformations' (that is, initiatives involving large-scale, planned, strategic, and administrative change; Abramson and Lawrence 2001; Kotter 1995) that are highly sensitive to political context conditions. The literature on organizational change in the public sector generally acknowledges that conditions within the political context affect the success of organizational change efforts (Bryson and Anderson, 2000; Chackerian and Mavima, 2000; Kelman, 2005; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Wise, 2002; Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999; Burke, 2002; Carnall, 1995). Fernandez and Rainey (2006), for example, include 'building external support from political overseers and key external stakeholders' among the (eight) factors that account for the effectiveness of organizational transformation processes. No detailed body of knowledge has been established, however, regarding how conditions within the political context affect the path and outcome of organizational transformations, especially when they interact with particular process design features. As we shall see, this study highlights that political context conditions (such as increased rivalry within the government coalition and faltering support from the government's constituencies) and process design features count as a distinct source of influence on organizational transformations in the public sector. 
	This paper aims to contribute to the development of positive theories of public policies and management, especially in the area of the implementation of the agencification process. We understand positive theories as interrelated knowledge claims about phenomena which extend over a period of time (Pettigrew, 1997; Abbott, 2001; Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009). A special class of positive theories, which are processual in nature, especially focus on generalized causal accounts about how actions are affected by other actions which precede them in time, by process design features, and by context conditions (Pettigrew, 1997). Processual positive theories, therefore, offer explanations of process outcomes based on the concatenation of cause-and-effect relationships where joint combinations of the results of past actions, process design features, and context factors are typically casted in the role of explanans. Instances of theoretical approaches which relate to the processual positive perspective include, among others, those developed along the research programs known as 'process tracing' (George, 1979; Bennett and George, 1997; George and Bennett, 2005), 'analytic narrative' (Bates et al., 1998, 2000; Levi, 2002), and, more recently, 'institutional processualism' (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006). 
	In this paper, the development of a theoretical account of the kind of organizational transformation that takes place in the agencification process is pursued through a case study (Ragin and Becker, 1992; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). The case presented here refers to the establishment of three agencies in place of five regional government-owned public entities by the Regional Government of Sardinia (Italy), for the provision of agricultural sector services. During this episode, which spans over the period between 2006 and 2009, public officials in the regional administration implemented part of Regional Act 13/2006, which provided the institution of one agency for scientific research in agriculture (AGRIS), one for the development of agriculture-related business (LAORE), and one for the delivery of financial aid to agriculture-related business (ARGEA). The same legislation also mandated to terminate the operations of the regional entity for technical assistance in agriculture (ERSAT), the regional entity for scientific research in agriculture (ERA), the regional offices for the provision of financial aid (SRA), and two provincial-level consortia for fruit production. Personnel and assets of the suppressed entities were transferred to the three new agencies.
	This paper provides, first, on the basis of semi-structured interviews conducted in 2009 with the general directors and 24 employees of the three newly established agencies, a narrative account of the key events in the establishment of public agencies through organizational restructuring (mergers and demergers). The paper then develops a research argument to explain the features of the path and outcome of the establishment of the three agencies, including the efforts exerted by organizational participants in realigning personnel and assets, developing novel organizational practices, and overcoming resistance to the adaptation of new work processes. Finally, the paper discusses the research findings by contrasting and comparing the results of this study with those of other scholarly works on the organizational transformation of public entities. The conclusions assess the contribution of these findings to the development of theories about the management of organizational transformations in the public sector.

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
	Organizational transformation in the public sector is a subject of study which has traditionally attracted a lot of attention in both the positive and normative scholarly literatures. Issues related to the design (or re-design) of organizational structures are typically addressed in any public management 'doctrine' (Hood, 1998) and are key components of various administrative arguments (Hood and Jackson, 1991, 1994). In spite of this, however, our understanding of how public entities are restructured is still far from complete. As highlighted by Thomas (1993), studies on this topic have generally focused on theoretical rationales for reorganizing the public sector, rather than investigating how public entities are actually reorganized as a way to empirically assess what accounts for success or failure or unintended consequences of reorganization efforts. Apart from some notable exceptions (e.g., Brown et al., 2003; Coram and Burnes, 2001; Hood et al., 1985; Pollitt, 1984; Hult, 1987), empirical research on the process through which public entities are reorganized – e.g., through mergers, demergers, and transfer of personnel and assets from one organization to another one – is still in short supply.
	This paper aims to fill this gap by contributing to the development of explanatory research arguments about the process dynamics of implementing organizational transformations in the public sector, especially focusing on management of the transfer of tasks and resources from branches of the executive bureaucracy to separate agencies. Drawing from the scholarly tradition of processual positive theories (Pettigrew, 1997; Barzelay and Gallego, 2006), the theoretical perspective followed in this study is attentive to the role played by time, path dependency, and changing context conditions (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000, 2004; Abbott, 2001). Moreover, taking into account the general features of the kind of process under consideration (the conversion of statutory enactments of authoritative governmental decisions into novel organizational routines performed by newly established agencies), this study refers to organization science as providing an appropriate frame of reference to develop an explanatory account of how organizational participants adopt new practices for carrying out the agency's statutory tasks (Feldman, 2003; Feldman and Pentland, 2003).
	As a way to theorize about how organizational restructuring of public entities is conducted, this paper follows a methodological approach commonly followed in the field of sociology and organizational sociology, which consists of gaining a causal understanding of social processes as interpretations based on supposed 'concatenations of social mechanisms' (Gambetta, 1998) and interactions with context factors. Social mechanisms have been variously defined (Merton, 1968; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; McAdam et al., 2001; Mahoney, 2003). In various scholarly works, they are understood as interpretations (Schelling, 1998) or hypothetical causal models (Gambetta, 1998) or plausible hypotheses that could be the explanation of some social phenomenon (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998) or frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns (Elster, 1998) about the behavior of entities at different levels (e.g. individuals) rather than the main entities being theorized about (e.g. a group or a social process). Setting minor differences aside, social mechanisms are broadly understood here as hypothesized social interactions which are believed to cause observable social effects. 
	Whatever definition is adopted, social mechanisms are generally understood as playing an important role in the analysis of social phenomena in a processual approach. Their function, essentially, is to fill the knowledge gap on how social processes work in detail by acting in a similar way to 'intervening variables' (George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and George, 1997) between causal factors and outcomes. As Sayer (1992:106-107) put it, “what we would like [...] is a knowledge of how the process works. Merely knowing that 'C' [cause] has generally been followed be 'E' [effect] is not enough; we want to understand the continuous process by which 'C' produced 'E,' if it did”. Once identified, social mechanisms are believed to provide a strong methodological basis for causal inferences about social processes (Bennett and George, 1997). For Hedström and Swedberg (1998:7) and Stinchcombe (1991:367), they can serve to make the higher-level theory “more supple, more accurate, or more general”. 
	The remainder of this paper will present an instrumental case study of the organizational restructuring of the regional service delivery administration in the agricultural sector in Sardinia. The episode's initial conditions include a policy image to ‘modernize’ the regional bureaucracy, the policy decision to establish three new agricultural agencies, the mandate to reorganize the regional agricultural administrative system by terminating the operation of five public entities and transferring their personnel and assets to three new agencies, and the heterogeneity of roles, identities, and job practices between the original regional entities. Process design features include decentralization of the agricultural payment process (and the related delegation of responsibilities) and the tightening of control over regional public agencies through the implementation of a new accounting system. Political context conditions encompass increased rivalry within the government coalition and faltering support from the government's constituency. The account of the episode focuses on how organizational participants carried out the reconfiguration of the systems for the delivery of agricultural services and adapted to the restructured organizational processes. In particular, it will show that tensions originating from the political context entailed troublesome and conflictual elements in the process of transferring personnel and assets to the newly established agencies and ultimately affected the emergence of organizational practices in the agencies (i.e., the case outcome).

THE AGENCIFICATION OF AGRICULTURE 
SERVICE DELIVERY IN SARDINIA (2006-2009)
Reforming the regional administrative system for agriculture services
	On 8th August 2006, the Regional Government of Sardinia led the regional assembly to pass Regional Act 13, which provided the establishment of one agency for scientific research in agriculture (Agenzia per la ricerca in agricoltura, AGRIS), one for the development of agriculture-related business (Agenzia per l’attuazione dei programmi regionali in campo agricolo e per lo sviluppo rurale, LAORE), and one for the delivery of financial aid to agriculture-related business (Agenzia regionale per la gestione e l’erogazione degli aiuti in agricoltura, ARGEA). The legislation also mandated to terminate the operations of five public entities, namely the regional entity for technical assistance in agriculture (ERSAT), the regional entity for scientific research in agriculture (ERA), the regional offices for the provision of financial aid (SRA), and two provincial-level consortia for fruit production. Act 13/2006 also contained provisions for transferring personnel and resources from the suppressed entities to the three new agencies.  
	The main aim of the reform was to overcome problems related to the fragmentation of the region’s agricultural service delivery system. Until that time, most agricultural services had been provided by ERSAT, which provided (staffed with about 1,000 employees) technical services to farmers, support for the development of cooperatives, advice about agro-industry and commercialization of agricultural products, training, and assistance for filing applications for financial support and for complying with aid eligibility requirements and obligations. Some assistance for financial aid was also provided by the offices of the regional executive bureaucracy (department of agriculture) named Servizi Ripartimentali per l'Agricoltura (SRA). Research activities (including providing services of technological transfer for improving the productivity of farms) were performed by two consortia for growing fruit crops named Consorzio Interprovinciale per la Frutticoltura di Cagliari, Nuoro e Oristano (CIF) and the Consorzio Provinciale per la Frutticoltura di Sassari (CPF) and by the regional entity Ente per la Ricerca in Agricoltura (ERA). ERA had been established in 2005 (Regional Act no. 7) through the merger of four regional entities conducting scientific research in different areas (agriculture, horse breeding, cork production, and dairy products), and which kept operating as relatively autonomous organizational units.
	The Regional Government held the view that such a configuration of the agricultural service delivery system hampered the implementation of effective agricultural policies. The many entities of the regional agricultural policy domain pursued partially overlapping statutory objectives, shared no tradition of inter-organizational collaboration, and, to some extent, competed against each other in the provision of similar services. Their clients were occasionally confused about the delimitation of competences between them and by the joint presence of different service providers. Additionally, the costs related to the boards of directors present in each entity seemed excessive, especially to the eyes of a Regional Government executive who had publicly committed themselves to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the whole regional administration. Moreover, the reconfiguration of the regional agricultural service delivery system was generally welcomed by farmers, whose support had largely contributed to the election of the regional governor, Renato Soru, in 2004.




Figure 1. Diagram of the reconfiguration of the regional agricultural agencies (* ERA had been formed through the merger of four regional research entities in 2004).

Transferring personnel and assets to the new agencies
	Soon after their appointment, the general directors of the three public agencies realized that the political environment had turned hostile towards the regional governor's agricultural policy. In early 2007, regional farmers (especially led by their syndicates Coldiretti and Confagricoltura) had mounted a protest against the Regional Government's inaction to tackle issues related to the reduction of farmers' subsidies and the increase of water and energy costs. The discontent of the farmers culminated in a demonstration on 20th March 2007, when delegates of about 8,000 agricultural firms rallied in the streets of the regional capital city. The apparent erosion of support for the regional governor from a main component of his constituency bore profound political implications. The Regional Government was sustained by a leftist coalition assembled around a brand-new party ('Progetto Sardegna') that Soru had founded in 2003. Although the regional governor had been directly elected by the voters and therefore enjoyed weighty prerogatives, other coalition parties (especially, Partito Democratico) were eager to overthrow his leadership at the earliest signs of Soru's 'political capital' decaying.
	Opposition against the planned reorganization of the agricultural agencies also spiraled within the regional administrative bureaucracy. The programmatic manifesto of Soru's government included radical actions to reconfigure most of the region’s administrative system for service delivery. This initiative alienated part of the regional administration personnel, who especially resisted the consolidation of functions previously performed by separate branches of the executive bureaucracy and the renegotiation of job contracts. By early 2007, the hostility within the regional administrative bureaucracy escalated to open conflict between the Regional Government and some labor unions (especially, the leftist CISL). Following a line of action that was later described as a 'fever for doing' ('la febbre del fare') by the regional councillor of personnel (Dadea, 2009), Soru reacted to the conflicts between his coalition parties and the regional administrative bureaucracy by increasing the pressure to get his government’s programmatic initiatives implemented as soon as possible – including, the restructuring of the agricultural service delivery system. With this move, the regional governor aimed to regain popular support by reducing the number of regional public agencies (whose proliferation he had portrayed as a waste of public money since the 2004 electoral campaign) and forestalling the consolidation of his opponents.
	Put under pressure to urgently carry out the restructuring, the general directors of the three agricultural agencies quickly arranged to stipulate the transfer of personnel and assets with the special commissioners who had been appointed to liquidate ERSAT, ERA, CIF, and CPF, and with the SRA offices of the department of agriculture . By and large, the terms of the transfer of personnel were rather plain and undisputed, as the same 2006 reform provided that employees would retain the same salary grade, career rank, and pension scheme, and would be subjected to the general job contract which applied to managers and employees of the regional administration. The transfer of assets proved somehow more difficult, as the regional entities possessed a relatively large estate (which included about 14,800 acres of farm land) but property ledgers were not complete or fully updated. 
	Within a few months, the legal requisites for the transfer of personnel and assets had been fulfilled. In July 2007, the Regional Government sanctioned the termination of the operations of ERSAT, ERA, CIF, and CIP, whose competences were taken over by ARGEA, LAORE, and AGRIS with immediate effect. But the identification of personnel and assets to transfer from the SRA offices of the regional department of agriculture to ARGEA proceeded more slowly, with the effect that the SRA offices were not suppressed until 1st October 2007. By the end of 2007, in any case, AGREA, LAORE, and AGRIS had been fully staffed and resourced – although, as we shall see, the realignment of human and physical resources into the three agencies had been conducted with relatively little regard to the integration of different workforces and the reconciliation of covert resentment against the restructuring operations amongst some of the employees.

Developing administrative and service delivery routines in the new agencies
	After the transfer of personnel and assets was completed, the general directors struggled to organize work processes within the three new agencies. While each general director faced rather specific organizational issues, they all generally needed to develop administrative and service delivery routines. By and large, agricultural services in each agency were provided by retaining the same work practices that had been carried out in the past. This arrangement somehow fitted with the task domain of AGRIS, where scientific research was conducted across diverse subject areas by relatively autonomous units. In ARGEA, however, novel organizational practices were designed in order to integrate the workforce coming from ERSAT and the SRA offices, which had performed partially overlapping or complementary activities in the past. Following the mandate stated in the reform legislation, ARGEA and LAORE also started to coordinate their activities to establish 'one-stop shops', i.e., shared office branches where the clients could receive both technical and financial assistance services.
	While existing service delivery routines were smoothly incorporated into the new agencies, the development of novel routines progressed rather slower. This was especially the case with the establishment of work practices to manage the payment process of aids to agricultural-related business in ARGEA. Until that time, the process of paying grants, subsidies, and awards to regional agricultural-related business (for a total amount of about € 300 million per year) had been managed by the national government's agency AGEA based in Rome. After the 2006 reform was made, the Regional Government intended to decentralize the management of the payment process to the regional level, in order to disburse payments faster, schedule payments according to priorities set within the regional agricultural policy, and better assist farmers in filing aid applications and complying with aid eligibility requirements and obligations. In order to qualify as an agricultural paying agency according to EU standards, several changes were made to the work practices in ARGEA, including the reallocation of responsibility for payment authorization, disbursement, book-keeping, and auditing to different individuals, the introduction of tracking for each single operation through a special software package, the adoption of separate cash accounting for managed aid funds, and the tightening of the internal auditing function which was made subordinate to the general director only. Only in July 2010 did ARGEA qualify for operating as an agricultural paying agency and started operating as such in October 2010. 
	In terms of developing administrative routines, the three agencies had to cope with difficulties which especially arose from the set up of their accounting systems. Each of the former regional entities had developed rather unique accounting tools and practices, as no common accounting policy had ever been set within the regional administration. The three agencies now had to adopt uniform accounting systems, according to the specifications provided by the accounting framework implemented by the Regional Government  in 2006 (Sistema Informativo di Base per gli Enti e le Agenzie Regionali or SIBEAR). The accounting systems of ARGEA and LAORE, therefore, were aligned to SIBEAR specifications. The one of AGRIS, however, called for exceptional efforts because of both the need to migrate accounting data from diverse systems used in the former regional entities and to tailor the accounting system to the research activities carried out in the agency. 
	Part of the problems encountered with the accounting systems originated from the context conditions under which the restructuring – especially, the demerger of ERSAT into ARGEA and LAORE – had been conducted. Because of the urgency to carry out the transfer of tasks and resources to the new agencies, accountants at ERSAT closed the financial period on 27th July 2007 and split accounts between the new accounting systems set up in ARGEA and LAORE in such a hurried way that some detailed account information was lost (i.e., disregarded) during the process. Moreover, accountants at ERSAT were only transferred to LAORE, with the effect that in the early period of its activity ARGEA lacked staff with the ability to carry out routine accounting operations. 

Adapting to the new work processes
	The development of administrative and service delivery routines in the three new agencies required personnel to adapt to new work processes. The adaptation process occasionally erupted into conflicts over the definition of novel procedures and the use of resources. For example, in the early period of their activity employees at ARGEA kept using cars which had been transferred from ERSAT to LAORE, with the effect that the latter agency incurred costs related to the behavior of ARGEA's staff (e.g., fines). In AGRIS, the negotiation over the selection of a new payroll software was conducted – in terms used by the agency's general director – in 'a bloodshed', because of disputes about the functional requirements of the payroll software, which needed to keep track of different career records, salary conditions, and pension schemes for the employees coming from each original regional entity. Similar disputes arose over such issues as the allocation of utilities and service contracts, the definition of procedures for scheduling vacations, and the obligation to exhibit an ID badge at work.
	Adaptation of the new work processes brought to the fore deep-seated differences amongst employees of the original regional entities. Each of these entities had been traditionally managed in an autonomous way, so that their staff had come to differ in terms of their own professional 'image', customs for organizing work, and ways of relating with clients (although they were all also used to relatively loose management control systems). The main entity, ERSAT, had been established in 1951 by the national government with the task of implementing the 1950 agrarian reform, and had been transferred to the Regional Government of Sardinia in 1979. Other entities operating in the areas of research in agricultural and dairy products (which had been merged into ERA in 2005) had been established in the 1940s. The origins of the entity for research on horse breeding even dated back to the 1860s.  
	Issues encountered in the adaptation of the new work processes became particularly troublesome in ARGEA, where employees coming from the SRA offices found themselves at odds with those from ERSAT. The former considered themselves as part of the regional executive bureaucracy rather than of 'implementing agencies', and had been generally involved in inspective activities in the past. The personnel from ERSAT, instead, regarded themselves as part of a professionalized bureaucracy, and had been traditionally oriented to providing technical assistance, promoting agricultural products, and working in close collaboration with farmers. The former generally regarded their transfer to ARGEA as diminishing their job positions, while the latter (in particular, former ERSAT managers) were offered opportunities for career development (especially, if ARGEA would become an agricultural paying agency).
	These differences in terms of perceived roles, identities, and job practices resulted in a clash when employees of the SRA offices were expected to adapt to work processes generally designed by managers from ERSAT. The former voiced their complaints about the adoption of bureaucratic procedures which replicated those in place at ERSAT but which did not have any counterpart in the former SRA offices, about the duty to use agency cars for job matters rather then their private ones, and (even) about the replacement of their original employee ID numbers with novel ones. Within the context of the urgent set up of the agricultural agencies in 2007, employees from the SRA offices matured a sense of 'having been deported' from the 'core' of the regional administration to the 'periphery', and of receiving unequal treatment with respect to employees from ERSAT. The fact that most of ARGEA managers, indeed, came from ERSAT, and that employees from the SRA offices had joined ARGEA later than those from ERSAT (in October rather than in August 2007) contributed to the entrenchment of these feeling, that never fully disappeared over coming years.

DISCUSSION
	This section aims to explain the path and outcome of the events that led to the development of administrative and service delivery routines in the new agricultural agencies (an outcome that can be conceived as a partial equilibrium situation; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The main issue at hand is how the regional agricultural policy subsystem changed when the 2006 reform was implemented through the demerger of ERSAT and the merger of various regional entities, resulting in the establishment of the agencies ARGEA, LAORE, and AGRIS. This issue underpins more specific research questions which drive the analysis of the case, namely how the statutory mandate to establish the new agencies was translated into organizational practices, what role the regional government played in the organizational restructuring process, and why the transfer of personnel and assets to the new agencies was partially a troublesome and conflictual process.
	These questions may be given tentative answers in the following terms. The appointed general directors chose to design the organizational structure of the new agencies by retaining the organizational practices that had been already in place in the former regional entities, apart from a few efforts to improve organizational efficiency and cost-effectiveness (e.g., by pooling together service delivery units into one-stop shops and by choosing to operate with one payroll software instead of several different ones). Moreover, the managerial efforts to carry out the organizational transformations were deeply affected by political context conditions, which instilled a sense of urgency to establish the three agencies in relatively short time. The Regional Government's agricultural policy, furthermore, included some process features (such as decentralization of the management of the agricultural payment process to the regional level and implementation of SIBEAR accounting framework) that entailed the particular design choices made to organize new work processes. By and large, these design choices and managerial actions contributed to the hostile response of part of the workforce – especially the personnel originating from SRA offices, who were primarily affected by a loss of status and benefits enjoyed within the regional executive bureaucracy. These answers, however, provide only a partial account of the process through which the organizational restructuring of the regional agricultural policy domain took place.  
	The case evidence suggests that further explanatory arguments can be found, in part, in the activation of a learning process in the three new agencies (Argyris, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988). Mechanisms related to both the setting of high aspiration levels (Levitt and March, 1988), the protection of professional identities and roles (Wenger, 2007), and the sense of stress (Weick, 2001) may have contributed to stimulating the workforce to search for and refine novel organizational routines. In ARGEA, the aspiration to become an agricultural paying agency (an outcome that bore important implications in terms of enhanced status within the regional agricultural policy domain and industry) may have motivated managers and employees to exert efforts to develop new administrative and service delivery routines. In LAORE and in AGRIS, the willingness to adapt to novel organizational practices may have been instilled by a sense of contribution to protect professional identities and roles as the providers of services to farmers (of a technical and research kind, respectively). The pressure exerted by the regional governor on the general directors to accomplish the organizational restructuring in a relatively short time may have generated a sense of stress that enhanced employees' receptiveness to changing work practices. These mechanisms contributed to the stimulation of a learning process leading to the adoption of administrative and service delivery routines which replicated, in part, those originally performed in the regional entities, while also expanded, in part, the task domain of the three agencies beyond what the former regional entities delivered. 
	The case evidence suggests that process features of the regional governmental policy – namely, the decentralization of the management of the agricultural payment process to the regional level and the implementation of SIBEAR accounting framework – stand as crucial causal factors in bringing about the organizational restructuring of the agricultural policy domain. Provided that causes arise from combinations of conditions (Ragin, 1989), these policy process features entailed, together with the urgency triggered by political context conditions, the preferential status granted to ERSAT professionals over SRA inspectors in ARGEA and the tightening of control systems with respect to the rather loose supervision of work practices in the original regional entities. These policy content features contribute to accounting for the particular responses of some of the employees in the new agricultural agencies. Together, the conditions originating from the political context and the process features of the regional government policy figure importantly in explaining how administrative and service delivery routines were developed in the new agricultural agencies. 
	Explaining the particular responses of some of the new agricultural agencies’ employees also calls into play the role of the initial conditions within the agricultural policy domain. Initial conditions included, in particular, heterogeneity between roles, identities, and job practices between the original regional entities. Such heterogeneity, which was prominent between ERSAT and SRA offices, contributes to explain the partially troublesome adaptation to new work processes. Within the merging of ERSAT and SRA offices into ARGEA, this condition needs to be taken into consideration together with the policy content features resulting from the transfer of tasks and resources to the new agencies under urgent circumstances. In terms of design choices and managerial efforts, relatively little care was placed in facilitating the integration of ERSAT and SRA workforces and on diffusing the resentment of SRA employees against the reorganization of the agencies. A hypothesized mechanism of polarization (McAdam et al., 2001), according to which description of the self and of others, programs, and claims from two opposing factions increasingly diverge and clash against each other in a self-reinforcing fashion, may help in explaining why employees from the SRA offices did not adapt well to the work processes designed by managers from ERSAT.





Roles, identities, and job practices in the original entities	Heterogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Policy content features			
Status of employees in the new agencies	Uneven	Equal	Equal
Design of control systems 	Tightened	Steady	Steady
Policy process features			
Implementation of new administrative functions	Present (decentralization of payment process)	Absent	Absent
Implementation of common accounting framework	Relatively plain	Relatively plain	Troubled
Implementation path and outcome features	Partially fraught	Relatively uncontested	Relatively uncontested
Hypothesized social mechanisms	Learning (Argyris, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988)Setting of high aspiration levels (Levitt and March, 1988)Sense of stress (Weick, 2001)Polarization (McAdam et al., 2001)	Learning (Argyris, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988)Protection of professional identities and roles(Wenger, 2007)Sense of stress (Weick, 2001)	Learning (Argyris, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988)Protection of professional identities and roles(Wenger, 2007)Sense of stress (Weick, 2001)
Table 1. Components of the explanatory argument.

CONCLUSIONS
	This paper contributes to the development of theoretical accounts of how organizational transformations of old public entities into new agencies are implemented. This study is relevant because existing generalizing research arguments about organizational change fail to adequately take into account specific conditions that are particularly sensitive in the implementation of organizational transformations in the public sector. Conceived as a special type of organizational change process, organizational transformations in the public sector (including those related to the 'agencification' of old public entities) are distinctively characterized by the influence of the political context. The present case study is exemplar in this respect, as the explanation of the case path and outcome suggests that political context conditions play an important role, together with particular policy process features, in the implementation dynamics of the organizational transformations of old public entities into new agencies.
	The central point of the research argument is that the features of the path and outcome of the establishment of the three new agencies (realigning personnel and assets to fulfil the statutory tasks of the agencies, developing novel organizational practices, and overcoming resistance to the adaptation of new work processes) can be explained through various social mechanisms, under conditions that include both features of the political context and of the policy process. In brief, the line of explanation is that the aspiration to become an agricultural paying agency and the sense of contributing to the continuity of professional services to farmers, combined with the urgency to accomplish the organizational restructuring in a relatively short time, induced a process of organizational learning which resulted in the development of novel organizational practices. The heterogeneity of organizational culture among the original regional entities, coupled with the lack of attention towards resentment against the restructuring operation (related to the urgency to transfer personnel and assets to the new agencies), triggered a process of polarization that resulted in the partially fraught adaptation to the new work processes. The path and outcome of the organizational restructuring in LAORE and in AGRIS, however, were less distressed than in ARGEA, a difference that may be related to both the greater cohesion of the workforce (i.e., a group of professionals sharing identities and roles as providers of technical and research services to farmers) and the absence of the pressure to implement new administrative functions (i.e., the decentralization of agriculture payment process). In sum, the social mechanisms of learning and polarization help to explain how features of the policy process and the political context affect the development and adaptation of organizational routines in newly established agencies. 
	Studies on organizational restructuring in the public sector have already highlighted the importance of understanding context conditions for the effective implementation of organizational transformation processes (especially variety of organizational cultures) (Christensen et al., 2006; Askim et al., 2008; Fulop et al., 2005) (a point also made in the general literature on mergers and acquisitions, e.g., Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Stahl et al., 2005; Buono and Bowditch, 2003). With respect to the generalizing research arguments put forward in these works, the findings of this case study suggest that theoretical accounts of organizational restructuring in the public sector should pay attention to how combinations of policy process and context conditions activate social mechanisms, how social mechanisms concatenate (Gambetta, 1998), and how they result in the development of new organizational routines. As an instance of how the role played by context conditions should be carefully weighed in light of the evidence, we can notice that, within the explanatory research argument about this case study, one effect of context conditions (i.e., the urgency to accomplish the agencification process) played a pivotal causal role in both the activation of a learning process within the regional agencies as well as in the polarization of part of the transferred workforce.
	The findings of this case study also suggest the qualification of existing generalizing research arguments on the part of organizational restructuring related to the transfer of personnel and assets to newly established agencies. The study of Ongaro (2006) on the devolution in the agricultural sector in the region of Lombardy in Italy in 1998, which included the reallocation of workforce (about 260 people) from the regional government to the local governments, is relevant here. In the Lombardy case, the transfer of personnel was not accompanied by any hotbed of protest, a result that Ongaro (2006) relates to the design of organizational interventions intended to facilitate the adaptation to new work processes (which included the set up of the Inter-institutional Table for Agriculture to consult public officials during the restructuring process, individual and plenary meetings in local governments, and training sessions jointly attended by employees from both the regional and local governments). The explanation for the smooth transfer of personnel includes, in particular, the role played by these organizational interventions on the activation of a mechanism forming the belief among the personnel to be relocated that ' the reform would inevitability take place'.  
	The present case study confirms the generalizing argument that organizational interventions designed to facilitate the adaptation to new work processes are important in carrying out a smooth transfer of personnel within organizational restructuring processes. This case also suggests, however, that the formation of a belief about the inevitability of the intended organizational transformations taking place may be unrelated to the smooth transfer of personnel from one part of the public administration to another. In both the Sardinia and the Lombardy cases, the personnel to relocate seemed to accept the terms of the transfer in a rather plain and undisputed way (in both cases, notably, they were provided with financial benefits to offset perceived loss of job positions). In the Sardinia case, however, the personnel of the SRA offices might have perceived the implementation of the agencification process as unavoidable, but this belief did not prevent them from cultivating and voicing their resentment against how the restructuring operations were conducted. This case study implies, then, that explanations of the path and outcome of transferring personnel and assets to new agencies need to take into account the possibility that certain social mechanisms, such as polarization, may prevail to hamper adaptation to new work processes.  The mechanism of polarization, in particular, may help in explaining how, under certain conditions related to regional government's policy directives and cultural diversity among the incumbent public entities, organizational restructuring in the public sector may be fraught with resistance during the implementation stage. 
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